Sand Creek Massacre:
A Closer Look
Other Names: Chivington
Creek Campaign (1864)
Date(s): November 29-30, 1864
Principal Commanders: Col. John Chivington [US]; Black
Kettle, Cheyenne [I]
Forces Engaged: Third Colorado Regiment (approx. 700
men) [US]; 500 Cheyennes and a few Arapahos [I]
Estimated Casualties: Total unknown (U.S. unknown; Indian
Description: Scattered Indian raids had caused
much ill-will between the white settlers and the Native Americans. In the autumn, Territorial (Colorado) officers
had offered a vague amnesty if Indians reported to army forts. Black Kettle with many Cheyennes and a few Arapahos,
believing themselves to be protected, established a winter camp about 40 miles from Fort Lyon. On November 29,
Col. John Chivington, who advocated Indian extermination, arrived near the camp, having marched there from Fort
Lyon. In spite of the American flag and a white flag flying over the camp, the troops attacked, killing and mutilating
about 200 of the Indians, two-thirds of whom were women and children.
CWSAC Reference #: CO001
Preservation Priority: II.2
A Closer Look
The slaughter lasted seven hours. Those who fought or dug trenches in the sand to hide were shot on the spot or
were blown to pieces by Col. John Chivington's mountain howitzers. Women, children, the elderly and the sick were
hunted down and shot as they fled across the sandy banks of Sand Creek. Later that day and all of the next, the
soldiers committing atrocities on the dead before departing the scene on December 1, 1864 to resume campaigning.
S. L. Davis
"Colonel John Milton Chivington of the Colorado Militia, previously
a Methodist minister, regarded the Indians with hatred. "I have come to kill Indians," he is known to
have said, "and believe it is right and honorable to use any means under God's heaven to kill Indians."
In 1864, hostilities between white settlers and Indians intensified when the Cheyennes were forced off their lands
onto a small strip of property in Colorado to make way for America's expansion westward. In an effort to subdue
the fighting, any non-hostile Indians were asked to retreat to their camps or risk being shot on sight. Many obeyed,
settling at Sand Creek. Early on the morning of November 29, 1864, when most of the warriors were out hunting,
Chivington led a band of volunteers from Colorado militia in a raid which became known as the infamous Sand Creek
massacre. At first hailed as a hero, Chivington was later discredited after a congressional investigation into
|Col. John M. Chivington, Courtesy of the Colorado Historical
First published as a report
of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, Massacre of the Cheyenne Indians, 38th Congress, Second Session,
Washington, 1865; and report of the Secretary of War, 39th Congress, Second Session, Senate Executive Documents
No. 26, Washington, 1867.
Chief Black Kettle, Courtesy of The National Archives.
|"After several years of fighting against the U.S. Army, which
was itself beleaguered by the Civil War, the Cheyenne were forced to surrender in September 1864. Meeting with
Colonel John M. Chivington at Camp Weld in September, Black Kettle and his tribe assumed a peace agreement had
been reached, and they camped at Sand Creek, forty miles away, under the impression they were under the protection
Lyon. Among the group were five hundred women and children
and only two hundred warrior. Two months later, on November 29, 1864, Chivington led his cavalry of 750 in a surprise
attack on the Indians, killing 105 women and children and 28 men, as well as mutilating the dead and wounded. These
events signified a terrible betrayal for chiefs willing to negotiate peace with the military."
Source: Text courtesy of Facts
On File, Inc.
|Col. John M. Chivington at Camp Weld with Black Kettle
and his men, Courtesy of Colorado Historical Society.
Deposition by John M. Chivington (1865)
Testimony of Colonel J. M. Chivington April 26, 1865
Testimony of Colonel J. M. Chivington
April 26, 1865
Interrogatories propounded to John M. Chivington by the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, and answers
thereto given by said Chivington reduced to writing, and subscribed and sworn to before Alexander W. Atkins, notary
public, at Denver, in the Territory of Colorado.
1st Question. What is your place of residence, your age and profession?
Answer. My place of residence is Denver, Colorado; my age, forty-five years; I have been colonel of 1st Colorado
and was mustered out of the service on or about the eighth day of January last, and have not been engaged in any
since that time.
2d question. Were you in November, 1864, in any employment, civil or military, under the authority of the United
if so, what was that employment, and what position did you hold?
Answer. In November, 1864, I was colonel of 1st Colorado cavalry, and in command of the district of Colorado.
3d question. Did you, as colonel in command of Colorado troops, about the 29th of November, 1864, make an attack
Indian village or camp at a place known as Sand creek? If so, state particularly the number of men under your command;
armed and equipped; whether mounted or not; and if you had any artillery, state the number of guns, and the batteries
which they belonged.
Answer. On the 29th day of November, 1864, the troops under my command attacked a camp of Cheyenne and Arapaho
Indians at a place known as Big Bend of Sandy, about forty miles north of Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory. There
were in my
command at that time about (500) five hundred men of the 3d regiment Colorado cavalry, under the immediate command
Colonel George L. Shoup, of said 3d regiment, and about (250) two hundred and fifty men of the 1st Colorado cavalry;
Major Scott J. Anthony commanded one battalion of said 1st regiment, and Lieutenant Luther Wilson commanded another
battalion of said 1st regiment. The 3d regiment was armed with rifled muskets, and Star's and Sharp's carbines.
A few of the
men of that regiment had revolvers. The men of the 1st regiment were armed with Star's and Sharp's carbines and
The men of the 3d regiment were poorly equipped; the supply of blankets, boots, hats, and caps was deficient. The
the 1st regiment were well equipped; all these troops were mounted. I had four 12-pound mountain howitzers, manned
detachments from cavalry companies; they did not belong to any battery company.
4th question. State as nearly as you can the number of Indians that were in the village or camp at the time the
made; how many of them were warriors; how many of them were old men, how many of them were women, and how many
them were children?
Answer. From the best and most reliable information I could obtain, there were in the Indian camp, at the time
of the attack,
about eleven (11) or twelve (12) hundred Indians: of these about seven hundred were warriors, and the remainder
women and children. I am not aware that there were any old men among them. There was an unusual number of males
them, for the reason that the war chiefs of both nations were assembled there evidently for some special purpose.
5th question. At what time of the day or night was the attack made? Was it a surprise to the Indians? What preparation,
had they made for defence or offence?
Answer. The attack was made about sunrise. In my opinion the Indians were surprised; they began, as soon as the
made, to oppose my troops, however, and were soon fighting desperately. Many of the Indians were armed with rifles
many with revolvers; I think all had bows and arrows. They had excavated trenches under the bank of Sand creek,
the vicinity of the Indian camp is high, and in many places precipitous. These trenches were two to three feet
deep, and, in
connexion with the banks, were evidently designed to protect the occupants from the fire of an enemy. They were
various points extending along the banks of the creek for several miles from the camp; there were marks of the
shovel used in excavating them; and the fact that snow was seen in the bottoms of some of the trenches, while all
disappeared from the surface of the country generally, sufficiently proved that they had been constructed some
previously. The Indians took shelter in these trenches as soon as the attack was made, and from thence resisted
of my troops.
6th question. What number did you lose in killed, what number in wounded, and what number in missing?
Answer. There were seven men killed, forty-seven wounded, and one was missing.
7th question. What number of Indians were killed; and what number of the killed were women, and what number were
Answer. From the best information I could obtain, I judge there were five hundred or six hundred Indians killed;
state positively the number killed, nor can I state positively the number of women and children killed. Officers
over the field, by my orders, after the battle, for the purpose of ascertaining the number of Indians killed, report
that they saw
but few women or children dead, no more than would certainly fall in an attack upon a camp in which they were.
passed over some portions of the field after the fight, and I saw but one woman who had been killed, and one who
hanged herself; I saw no dead children. From all I could learn, I arrived at the conclusion that but few women
had been slain. I am of the opinion that when the attack was made on the Indian camp the greater number of squaws
children made their escape, while the warriors remained to fight my troops.
8th question. State, as nearly as you can, the number of Indians that were wounded, giving the number of women
number of children among the wounded.
Answer. I do not know that any Indians were wounded that were not killed; if there were any wounded, I do not think
could have been made prisoners without endangering the lives of soldiers; Indians usually fight as long as they
to resist. Eight Indians fell into the hands of the troops alive, to my knowledge; these, with one exception, were
sent to Fort
Lyon and properly cared for.
9th question. What property was captured by the forces under your command? State the number of horses, mules and
buffalo robes, blankets, and also all other property taken, specifying particularly the kinds, quality, and value
Answer. There were horses, mules, and ponies captured to the number of about six hundred. There were about one
buffalo robes taken. Some of this stock had been stolen by the Indians from the government during last spring,
fall, and some of the stock was the property of private citizens from whom they had been stolen during the same
horses that belonged to the government were returned to the officers responsible for them; as nearly as could be
horses and mules that were owned by private citizens were returned to them on proof of ownership being furnished;
were my orders at least. The ponies, horses, and mules for which no owner could be found, were put into the hands
provost marshal in the field, Captain J.J. Johnson, of company E, 3d Colorado cavalry, with instructions to drive
Denver and turn them over to the acting quartermaster as captured stock, taking his receipt therefor. After I arrived
I again directed Captain Johnson to turn these animals over to Captain Gorton, assistant quartermaster, as captured
which I presume he did. Colonel Thos. Moonlight relieved me of the command of the district soon after I arrived
that is to say, on the ______ day of _________, A.D. 186 -, and I was mustered out of the service, the term of
service of my
regiment having expired. My troops were not fully supplied with hospital equipage, having been on forced marches.
weather was exceedingly cold, and additional covering for the wounded became necessary; I ordered the buffalo robes
used for that purpose. I know of no other property of value being captured. It is alleged that groceries were taken
Smith, United States Indian interpreter for Upper Arkansas agency, who was in the Indian camp at the time of the
trading goods, powder, lead, cap, &c., to the Indians. Smith told me that these groceries belonged to Samuel
United States Indian agent. I am not aware that these things were taken; I am aware that Smith and D.D. Colby,
son of the
Indian agent, have each presented claims against the government for these articles. The buffalo robes mentioned
also claimed by Samuel G. Colby, D.D. Colby and John Smith. One bale of Buffalo robes was marked S. S. Soule, lst
Colorado cavalry, and I am informed that one bale was marked Anthony, Major Anthony being in command of Fort Lyon
that time. I cannot say what has been done with the property since I was relieved of the command and mustered out
service. There was a large quantity of Indian trinkets taken at the Indian camp which were of no value. The soldiers
a few of these as trophies; the remainder with the Indian lodges were destroyed.
10th question. What reason had you for making the attack? What reasons, if any, had you to believe that Black Kettle
other Indian or Indians in the camp entertained feelings of hostility towards the whites? Give in detail the names
Indians so believed to be hostile, with the dates and places of their hostile acts, so far as you may be able to
Answer. My reason for making the attack on the Indian camp was, that I believed the Indians in the camp were hostile
whites. That they were of the same tribes with those who had murdered many persons and destroyed much valuable
on the Platte and Arkansas rivers during the previous spring, summer and fall was beyond a doubt. When a tribe
of Indians is
at war with the whites it is impossible to determine what party or band of the tribe or the name of the Indian
belonging to the tribe so at war are guilty of the acts of hostility. The most that can be ascertained is that
Indians of the tribe
have performed the acts. During the spring, summer and fall of the year 1864, the Arapaho and Cheyenne Indians,
instances assisted or led on by Sioux, Kiowas, Comanches and Apaches, had committed many acts of hostility in the
lying between the Little Blue and the Rocky mountains and the Platte and Arkansas rivers. They had murdered many
whites and taken others prisoners, and had destroyed valuable property, probably amounting to $200,000 or $300,000.
rendezvous was on the headwaters of the Republican, probably one hundred miles from where the Indian camp was located.
I had every reason to believe that these Indians were either directly or indirectly concerned in the outrages which
committed upon the whites. I had no means of ascertaining what were the names of the Indians who had committed
outrages other than the declarations of the Indians themselves; and the character of Indians in the western country
and veracity, like their respect for the chastity of women who may become prisoners in their hands, is not of that
is calculated to inspire confidence in what they may say. In this view I was supported by Major Anthony, lst Colorado
cavalry, commanding at Fort Lyon, and Samuel G. Colby, United States Indian agent, who, as they had been in
communication with these Indians, were more competent to judge of their disposition towards the whites than myself.
Previous to the battle they expressed to me the opinion that the Indians should be punished. We found in the camp
of nineteen (19) white persons. One of the surgeons informed me that one of these scalps had been taken from the
head not more than four days previously. I can furnish a child captured at the camp ornamented with six white women's
scalps; these scalps must have been taken by these Indians or furnished to them for their gratification and amusement
of their brethren, who, like themselves, were in amity with the whites.
11th question. Had you any, and if so, what reason, to believe that Black Kettle and the Indians with him, at the
time of your
attack, were at peace with the whites, and desired to remain at peace with them?
Answer. I had no reason to believe that Black Kettle and the Indians with him were in good faith at peace with
The day before the attack Major Scott J. Anthony, lst Colorado cavalry, then in command at Fort Lyon, told me that
Indians were hostile; that he had ordered his sentinels to fire on them if they attempted to come into the post,
and that the
sentinenls had fired on them; that he was apprehensive of an attack from these Indians, and had taken every precaution
prevent a surprise. Major Samuel G. Colby, United States Indian agent for these Indians, told me on the same day
that he had
done everything in his power to make them behave themselves, and that for the last six months he could do nothing
that nothing but a sound whipping would bring a lasting peace with them. These statements were made to me in the
of the officers of my staff whose statements can be obtained to corroborate the foregoing.
12th question. Had you reason to know or believe that these Indians had sent their chief and leading men at any
Denver city in order to take measure in connection with the superintendent of Indian affairs there, or with any
having authority, to secure friendly relations with the whites?
Answer. I was present at an interview between Governor Evans on the part of the whites, and Black Kettle and six
Indians, at Camp Weldmar, Denver, about 27th of September, 1864, in which the Indians desired peace, but did not
terms. General Curtis, by telegraph to me, declined to make peace with them , and said that there could be no peace
his consent. Governor Evans declined to treat with them, and as General Curtis was then in command of the department,
of course, I could not disobey his instructions. General Curtis's terms of peace were to require all bad Indians
to be given by
the Indians for their good conduct. The Indians never complied with these terms.
13th question. Were those Indians, to your knowledge, referred by the superintendent of Indian affairs to the military
authorities, as the only power under the government to afford them protection?
Answer. Governor Evans, in the conference mentioned in my last answer, did not refer the Indians to the Military
for protection, but for terms of peace. He told the Indians "that he was the peace chief, that they had gone
to war, and,
therefore, must deal with the war chiefs." It was at this time I gave them the terms of General Curtis, and
they said they had
not received power to make peace on such terms, that they would report to their young men and see what they would
it; they would like to do it, but if their young men continued the war they would have to go with them. They said
three or four small war parties of their young men out on the war path against the whites at that time. This ended
14th question. Did the officer in command of Fort Lyon, to your knowledge, at any time extend the protection of
our flag to
Black Kettle and Indians with him, and direct them to encamp upon the reservation of the fort?
Answer. Major E.W. Wynkoop, lst cavalry, Colorado, did, as I have been informed, allow some of these Indians to
or near Fort Lyon, and did promise them the protection of our flag. Subsequently he was relieved of the command
Lyon, and Major Anthony placed in command at that post, who required the Indians to comply with General Curtis's
which they failed to do, and thereupon Major Anthony drove them away from the post.
15th question. Were rations ever issued to those Indians either as prisoners of war or otherwise?
Answer. I have been informed that Major Wynkoop issued rations to the Indians encamped near Fort Lyon while he
command, but whether as prisoners of war I do not know. I think that Major Anthony did not issue any rations.
16th question. And did those Indians remove, in pursuance of the directions, instructions, or suggestions of the
at Fort Lyon, to the place on Sand creek, where they were attacked by you?
Answer. I have been informed that Major Anthony, commandant at Fort Lyon, did order the Indians to remove from
but I am not aware that they were ordered to go to the place where the battle was fought, or to any other place.
17th question. What measures were taken by you, at any time, to render the attack on those Indians a surprise?
Answer. I took every precaution to render the attack upon the Indians a surprise, for the reason that we had been
catch them, and it appeared to me that the only way to deal with them was to surprise them in their place of rendezvous.
General Curtis, in his campaign against them, had failed to catch them; General Mitchel had met with no better
General Blunt had been surprised by them, and his command nearly cut to pieces.
18th question. State in detail the disposition made of the various articles of property, horses, mules, ponies,
&c., captured by you at the time of this attack and by what authority was such disposition made?
Answer. The horses and mules that had been stolen from the government were turned over to the officer who had been
responsible for the same; and the animals belonging to Atzins was returned to them upon proof being made of such
ownership. The animals not disposed of in this way were turned over to Captain S.J. Johnson, 3d regiment Colorado
cavalry, with instructions to proceed with the same to Denver, and turn them into the quartermaster's department.
command arrived in Denver, I again directed Captain Johnson to turn over the stock to Captain C.L. Gorton, assistant
quartermaster, at that place. The buffalo robes were turned into the hospital for use of the wounded as before
19th question. Make such further statement as you may desire, or which may be necessary to a full understanding
matters relating to the attack upon the Indians at Sand creek.
Answer. Since August, 1863, I had been in possession of the most conclusive evidence of the alliance, for the purposes
hostility against the whites, of the Sioux, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Camanche River, and Apache Indians. Their plan
interrupt, or, if possible, entirely prevent all travel on the routes along the Arkansas and Platte rivers from
the States to the
Rocky mountains, and thereby depopulate this country. Rebel emissaries were long since sent among the Indians to
them against the whites, and afford a medium of communication between the rebels and the Indians; among whom was
Bent, a half-breed Cheyenne Indian, but educated, and to all appearances a white man, who, having served under
Missouri, and afterwards becoming a bushwacker, being taken prisoner, took the oath of allegiance, and was paroled,
which he immediately joined the Indians, and has ever since been one of their most prominent leaders in all depredations
upon the whites. I have been reliably informed that this half-breed, Bent, in order to incite the Indians against
the whites, told
them that the Great Father at Washington having all he could do to fight his children at the south, they could
now regain their
When John Evans, governor of Colorado Territory, and ex officio superintendent of Indian affairs, visited by appointment
Cheyenne Indians on the Republican fork of the Kansas river, to talk with them in regard to their relations with
government, the Indians would have nothing to say to him, nor would they receive the presents sent them by the
but immediately on his arrival at the said point the Indians moved to a great distance, all their villages appearing
not to have any intercourse with him individually or as the agent of the government.
This state of affairs continued for a number of months, during which time white men who had been trading with the
informed me that the Indians had determined to make war upon the whites as soon as the grass was green, and that
making preparations for such an event by the large number of arrows they were making and the quantity of arms and
ammunition they were collecting; that the settlers along the Platte and Arkansas rivers should be warned of the
danger; that the Indians had declared their intention to prosecute the war vigorously when they commenced. With
troops at my command I could do but little to protect the settlers except to collect the latest intelligence from
country, communicate it to General Curtis, commanding department of Missouri, and warn the settlers of relations
between the Indians and the whites, and the probability trouble, all of which I did.
Last April, 1864, the Indians, Cheyennes, Arapahoes, and others, commenced their depredations upon the whites by
their isolated habitations in the distant parts of this territory, taking therefrom everything they desired, and
balance; driving off their stock, horses, mules and cattle. I sent a detachment of troops after the Indians to
recover the stolen
property, when the stock &c., being demanded of them they (the Indians) refused to surrender the property so
taken from the
whites, and stated that they wanted to fight the troops. Again, when a few weeks after the country along the Platte
Fremont's orchard, became the theatre of their depredations, one Ripley, a ranchman, living on the Bijon creek,
Sanborn, came into camp and informed Captain Sanborn, commanding, that his stock had all been stolen by the Indians,
requesting assistance to recover it. Captain Sanborn ordered Lieutenant Clark Dunn, with a detachment of troops,
the Indians and recover the stock; but, if possible, to avoid a collision with them. Upon approaching the Indians,
Dunn dismounted, walked forward alone about fifty paces from his command, and requested the Indians to return the
which Mr. Ripley had recognized as his; but the Indians treated him with contempt, and commenced firing upon him,
resulted in four of the troops being wounded and about fifteen Indians being killed and wounded, Lieutenant Dunn
escaping with his life. Again, about one hundred and seventy-five head of cattle were stolen from Messrs. Irwin
Jackman, government freighters, when troops were sent in pursuit toward the headwaters of the Republican. They
upon by the Indians miles from where the Indians were camped. In this encounter the Indians killed one soldier
another. Again, when the troops were near the Smoky Hill, after stock, while passing through a canon, about eighty
from Fort Larned, they were attacked by these same Cheyenne Indians, and others, and almost cut to pieces, there
fifteen hundred Indians. Again, when on a Sunday morning the Kiowas and Camanches were at Fort Larned, to obtain
rations that the commanding officer, on behalf of the government, was issuing to them, they, at a preconcerted
upon the sentinels at the fort, making a general attack upon the unsuspecting garrison, while the balance of the
driving off the stock belonging to the government, and then as suddenly departed, leaving the garrison afoot excepting
thirty artillery horses that were saved; thus obtaining in all about two hundred and eighty head of stock, including
herd taken from the suttler at that post.
Again, a few days after this, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes Indians, with whom I had the fight at Sand creek, meeting
government train bound for New Mexico, thirty miles east of Fort Larned, at Walnut creek, who, after manifesting
deal of friendship by shaking hands, &c., with every person in the train, suddenly attacked them, killing fourteen
wounding a number more scalping and mutilating in the most inhuman manner those they killed, while they scalped
this party alive, one a boy about fourteen years of age, who has since become an imbecile. The two persons that
scalped alive I saw a few days after this occurred within sight of Fort Zarah, the officer commanding considered
command entirely inadequate to render any assistance. But we think we have related enough to satisfy the most incredulous
of the determined hostility of these Indians; suffice it to say that during the spring, summer, and fall such atrocious
of almost daily occurrence along the Platte and Arkansas routes, till the Indians becoming so bold that a family,
a man, woman, and two children, by the name of Hungate, were brutally murdered and scalped within fifteen miles
Denver, the bodies being brought to Denver for interment. After seeing which, any person who could for a moment
that these Indians were friendly, to say the least, must have strange ideas of their habits. We could not see it
in that light.
This last atrocious act was referred to by Governor Evans in his talk with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes Indians
on about the
27th day of September, 1864, at Denver, Colorado Territory. The Indians then stated that it had been dome by members
their tribe, and that they never denied it. All these things were promptly reported to Major General S. R. Curtis,
department, who repeatedly ordered me, regardless of district lines, to appropriately chastise the Indians, which
endeavored to do. Major General S. R. Curtis himself and Brigadeer General R. B. Mitchell made campaigns against
Indians, but could not find them; the Indians succeeded in keeping entirely from their view. Again, Major General
J. P. Blunt
made a campaign against the Indians; was surprised by them, and a portion of his command nearly cut to pieces.
Commanding only a district with very few troops under my control, with hundreds of miles between my headquarters
rendezvous of the Indians, with a large portion of the Sante Fe and Platte routes, besides the sparsely settled
settlements of this Territory, to protect, I could not do anything till the 3d regiment was organized and equipped,
determined to strike a blow against this savage and determined foe. When I reached Fort Lyon, after passing over
to five feet of snow, and greatly suffering from the intensity of the cold, the thermometer ranging from 28 to
below zero, I questioned Major Anthony in regard to the whereabouts of hostile Indians. He said there was a camp
Cheyennes and Arapahoes about fifty miles distant; that he would have attacked before, but did not consider his
sufficient; that these Indians had threatened to attack the post, &c., and ought to be whipped, all of which
was concurred in
by Major Colley, Indian agent for the district of the Arkansas, which information, with the positive orders from
General Curtis, commanding the department, to punish these Indians, decided my course, and resulted in the battle
Creek, which has created such a sensation in Congress through the lying reports of interested and malicious parties.
On my arrival at Fort Lyon, in all my conversations with Major Anthony, commanding the post, and Major Colley,
agent, I heard nothing of this recent statement that the Indians were under the protection of the government, &c.,;
Anthony repeatedly stated to me that he had at different times fired upon these Indians, and that they were hostile,
my stay at Fort Lyon, urged the necessity of any immediately attacking the Indians before they could learn of the
troops at Fort Lyon, and so desirous was Major Colly, Indian agent, that I should find and also attack the Arapahoes,
sent a messenger after the fight at Sand creek, nearly forty miles, to inform me where I could find the Arapahoes
yet, strange to say, I have learned recently that these men, Anthony and Colly, are the most bitter in their denunciations
attack upon the Indians at Sand creek. Therefore, I would, in conclusion, most respectfully demand, as an act of
myself and the brave men whom I have had the honor to command in one of the hardest campaigns ever made in this
whether against white men or red, that we be allowed that right guaranteed to every American citizen, of introducing
evidence in our behalf to sustain us in what we believe to have been an act of duty to ourselves and to civilization.
We simply ask to introduce as witnesses men that were present during the campaign and know all the facts.
Lieu't Col. 1st Cavalry of Colerado, Com'd'g Dist. of Colerado.
Sworn and subscribed to before me this 26th day of April, 1865.
ALEXANDER W. ATKINS,
Site Donated to Indians
Sand Creek Massacre Project Special
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REPENT SAND CREEK
MASSACRE OF NATIVE AMERICANS, 1996
Colorado Indian Massacre Location to Become
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